Northern Ireland: A peace process thwarted by accidental spoiling

The Northern Ireland peace process was constructed with spoilers in mind. Seven previous British government political initiatives aimed at staunching the conflict ended in failure between 1972 and 1993. Various factors accounted for these failures, but the initiatives all shared the common trait of excluding powerful veto holders (many of them capable of engaging in spoiling). Rather than excluding groups and constituencies prepared and capable of making any new political dispensation unworkable, the peace process of the 1990s deliberately sought to include veto holders. As a result, opportunities for spoilers were drastically reduced. This makes the Northern Ireland case particularly interesting vis-a-vis the spoiling debate for at least two reasons. First, Northern Ireland may be in a position to offer lessons to other peacemaking processes on structural and procedural factors that limited spoiling. Second, spoiling behaviour in Northern Ireland often adopted subtle forms, thus raising questions on the conceptual boundaries of spoilers and spoiling behaviour.

Sustainable Development Goals:

Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions