Asia-Pacific Population Journal - Volume 22, Issue 2, 2007

In the 1960s, demographers projected that the world’s population would reach 16 billion people by 2050, if the then very high fertility rates in most countries were not brought under control. Today, the projected population in 2050 is around 9 billion. This reduction of the world’s population by 7 billion people from what might have been is one of the most remarkable but least heralded achievements of humankind. Most of the success, in numerical terms, can be attributed to falls in birth rates in Asian countries. In China alone, if fertility had remained at its late 1970s, relatively low level of 2.6 births per woman, the Chinese population in 2050 would be 1 billion more than is now projected.

In current discussions of the fertility transition in Asia, the role of marriage change is frequently understated, because of the strong emphasis (perhaps flowing from the influence of the family planning movement) on marital fertility. Yet, since the time of Malthus, marriage change has been given strong attention in historical studies of fertility transition in Europe. In North-Western Europe, early in the twentieth century, non-marriage was a major factor affecting fertility. In some countries, the proportion of women remaining single at the end of their childbearing period reached 20 per cent (Hajnal, 1965; Therborn, 2004: 147-155). Such high levels of non-marriage did not always directly translate into lower fertility, because out-of-wedlock births were not uncommon; but they certainly played an important role in fertility decline.

Global population growth has been slowing down over the past few decades primarily because of the almost universal reduction in fertility. From 1970 to 1975, the number of countries with below-replacement fertility was 19, increasing to 65 by the period from 2000 to 2005. The overwhelming majority of those low-fertility countries are in the developed regions. However, the number of countries in the developing regions with below-replacement fertility has been increasing substantially over the past three decades, reaching 19 in the recent past. The number of countries with lowest-low fertility, being those with a total fertility rate (TFR) below 1.3, has grown from 0 to 17 during the same period.

For the past several decades, in rich and poor countries alike, life expectancy at birth has seemed to rise. Contrary to the predictions of demographers, the expected lifespan at birth has increased nearly linearly, in developed countries as well as the developing countries of Africa, South America and Asia as if there were no upper limits. More recently, fertility rates appear to be no exception to that sort of convergence. Fertility has declined dramatically almost everywhere, first in European countries and later in non-European countries. Demographers predicted that fertility would stabilize around replacement levels once the fertility transition from high to low was completed in the twentieth century. Unfortunately, declining fertility has not stabilized in developed countries. For years, fertility has hovered below the replacement level in developed European countries. As if in imitation, fertility in developing countries also has approached replacement level, or in many cases, dipped below. As is the case for mortality, fertility in both rich and poor countries is certain to converge towards lower fertility.

China currently is the country with the largest population in the world. The Fifth National Population Census in 2000 reports that the total population of mainland China stands at 1.27 billion (Zhuang and Zhang, 2003), while the 1 Percent National Population Sample Survey (mini-census) carried out in November 2005 reports the total population to be at 1.31 billion (National Statistics Bureau (NSB), 2006).1 China is also the country with the most stringent and government-directed family planning programme and fertility policy, having experienced a dramatic decline in fertility from 5 to 6 children per woman in the 1950s to less than 2 in recent years. The 2000 census reports China’s total fertility rate (TFR) to be at 1.4 (NSB, 2003). The rapid changes occurring in China’s population dynamics call for a review of the fertility transition in China in terms of trends, policy and impact. This article will first discuss the population dynamics ongoing in China in terms of growth, birth rate and fertility and then examine the fertility policy implemented by the Government of China, before exploring the impact of fertility decline in terms of population ageing, gender equality, sex ratio at birth and labour supply.

Low fertility has become an important area of demographic research as fertility in many countries has fallen to levels well below replacement. Advanced countries have experienced low fertility trends for decades (United Nations, 2000), and some are experiencing lowest-low fertility (i.e. TFR below 1.3) (Kohler, Billari and Ortega, 2002; Caldwell, 2006). Less developed countries, by contrast, have recently experienced low fertility levels, and there no longer seem to be any barriers to most countries reaching replacement level and subsequently falling below that level. According to the United Nations, by 2000, around 44 per cent of the world population lived in countries where fertility had fallen below the replacement level. This proportion is expected to increase to 67 per cent by the year 2015 (United Nations, 2000). According to the United Nations median variant projections, approximately 80 per cent of the world’s population is projected to live in countries with below-replacement fertility before mid-century (United Nations, 2002a). Several East and North-East, as well as North and Central Asian countries have attained below replacement in recent decades (Gubhaju and Moriki-Durand, 2003; Atoh, 2001; Hirschman, Chamratrithirong and Guest, 1994; Knodel, Chamratrithirong and Debavalya, 1987). However, countries have attained low fertility in different ways (Perelli-Harris, 2005) and thus, every country and region may have a unique experience in reaching low fertility. For instance, Hirschman, Chamratrithirong and Guest (1994) have argued that the distinctive attributes of East Asian countries such as Hong Kong, China; Singapore; the Republic of Korea; and Taiwan Province of China in terms of rapid economic growth and Confucian cultural heritage would not make them a model for fertility decline in other countries in Asia.

Finally, at the turn of the century and after decades of stagnancy, there was definite evidence of a decline in fertility in Pakistan. Fertility in Pakistan probably began to decline in the early 1990s or even in the late 1980s. Significantly, all estimates for the 1990s for the first time fell below 6.0 births per woman to a little less than five. This is in contrast to numerous surveys that indicated that the TFR remained above six births per woman in the 1980s. Furthermore the last census held finally in 1998, indicated that the average population growth rate for the period 1981-1998 was 2.6 per cent per annum, a decline from previous intercensal rates, consistent with a decline in fertility in the 1990s. While this trend in fertility decline has continued even touted as one of the “fastest declines in Asia” (Feeney and Alam, 2003) the latest Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS) indicates a stall in fertility at four children per woman.